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Book Reviews

Book Reviews
Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press. By Richard Davis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1994. 193p.
No doubt Americans have been debating
the role of the United States Supreme Court since
the Federalist Papers. Some believe the Court
should be active, some believe the Court should
be more reticent, some believe the Court should
strictly interpret the Constitution, some believe a
more "loose" interpretation is required. In the
midst of these debates, Richard Davis has suggested another perspective to consider: the
Court's interaction with the media and the effect
this interaction has on the general public.
In Decisions and Images, Davis has two
main contentions. First, Davis argues that the
Court (contrary to traditional belief) is a political
institution and, as a political institution, must
pursue specific relations with the press in order
to maintain public support. Second, Davis believes that each individual justice has opinions,
aims, and objectives separate from the objectives
of the Court, and the justices try to achieve their
aims through separate interactions with the
press.
To argue his position, Davis first presents
the theoretical background, induding which images the Court must sustain images of unanimity,
of independence, of distance, and of immunity in
order to achieve its institutional objectives of deference and compliance. As Davis discusses how
justices interact with the press and what the motivations of each are in their interaction, he consistently returns to the images and the objectives
that the Court must preserve. He suggests, for
example, that the Court's images were threatened
in the 1930s. The Court seemed unwilling to

the public perceives it and actively work to perpetuate positive images.
Richard Davis' thesis is quite interesting.
It is a tricky argument however. Davis argues
that the Court wants to perpetuate an "image" of
aloofness, an image of simply focusing on duty,
of independence from public pressure. Preserving these particular images is rather difficult.
Davis recognizes the paradox when he notes,
"[t]his is the crux of the paradox in imagemaking--to engage in imagemaking while denying its
existence to maintain the image" (9). Despite the
fact that he recognizes the difficulty, it seems that
Davis finds it difficult at times to discuss how it
is that the Court is actively perpetuating its image
of doing its job--rather than simply doing its job.
For example, it is no doubt true that the "[n]ews
of the u.s. Supreme Court is the product of the
interaction between the justices and the reporters
who cover them" (144). Moreover, it is quite obvious that by picking certain cases and denying
others, the Court is "successful at setting the
agenda for press coverage" (144). Simply by virtue of doing its job, the Court decides what will
become newsworthy. However, there seems to be
a missing link between the Court doing its job
(and choosing whether or not to hear cases), and
the Court choosing cases in order to purposely
"[offer] the news it wants the press to cover," or,
in other words, the Court choosing cases to purposely perpetuate an image (144). The distinction
is difficult to define because it is in part a distinction between what is and what appears to be-and with an organization that is (or, at least, appears to be) as aloof and private as the U.S. Supreme Court, the distinction is not always obvious.
Davis presents his arguments and supports them by discussing the everyday role of the
press at the Court as well as everyday role of the
Court. He argues that the justices and the reporters engaged to cover the Court are involved in an
intricate "dance," a dance that the justices are
"leading." "By limiting press access with one
hand and simultaneously feeding the press with
the other, the Court is acting much like other political institutions, especially the presidency, in

... sanction the constitutionality of the New
Deal. Severe criticism of the Court's decisions arose from some prominent newspapers. Harlan Stone commented in a letter to his sister at the end of the 1935 term:
'We finished the term of Court yesterday. I
think in many ways one of the most disastrous in its history. (31)

Without public support, it was possible for
Franklin Delano Roosevelt to question the number of justices on the Court and to suggest
changes. Pointing to this example and others,
Davis argues that the Court must care about how
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an image of disinterestedness or whether they
simply are disinterested is difficult to determine.
Despite the difficulty in overcoming this
paradox once and for all, Davis' book is well
worth reading. His efficient research and his extensive sources are thorough and persuasive.
The text is clear and supported by interesting examples. Moreover, reading is further facilitated
by appropriate headings and excellent summaries in each chapter. Overall, Decisions and Images:
The Supreme Court and the Press is timely and insightful. Richard Davis certainly raises issues
which should be discussed and debated along
with other Supreme Court debates.

attempts to use its power to control the information flow to its own advantage" (130). Once again
the paradox of the text is evident: Davis argues
that "[t]he justices seek to convey the impression
that they are disinterested in news coverage
about them and that they would be satisfied if
the press would just go away" (131). He suggests
that this practice (of consciously "active" disinterest) forces the reporters to turn to the news
that the justices want them to turn to, namely, the
written decisions. This certainly could be true.
Or, it could also be true that the justices simply
"enjoy their relative obscurity as individuals, "
which Davis suggests a few pages later (152). As
reporter Tony Mauro explains, "They [the justices] much covet their privacy and their anonymity ... They're very loath to lose that" (152).
Whether the justices are purposely perpetuating
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